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or the term following the confirmation of Justice Alito and 
Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court did not grant 
certiorari on any Indian law case for perhaps the first time since 
1960.2  With the Native American Rights Fund and other pan-
Indian organizations actively pursuing an avoid-the-Court 
strategy, necessitated by the Court’s hostility toward Indian 
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2007 Emerging Indian Law Scholars Roundtable at Lewis and Clark Law School, 
the 2008 property law works-in-progress conference hosted by Widener School of 
Law, and the 2008 DU-CU Indian Law Works in Progress Symposium.  Thanks 
especially to Annelise Riles for her invitation to speak at Cornell regarding the New 
York Indian land claims.  That invitation inspired this Article.  The Author is 
Anglo. 
1 This is the first of two connected articles exploring the relationship between 
Indian property ownership and area non-Indian property owners.  The second 
article is: Ezra Rosser, Barry Guertin & Alan Rukin, Empirical Analysis of the 
Effect of Tribal Ownership of Land on Non-Indians (work-in-progress, on file with 
the author).  The approach in this Article is primarily qualitative and the 
subsequent article’s approach is primarily quantitative using tax records and 
Geographic Information System (“GIS”) information. 
2 Posting of Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The S. Ct.’s New Indian Law Agenda?, For 
the Seventh Generation Blog, http://tribal-law.blogspot.com/2007/04/s-cts-new-
indian-law-agenda.html (Apr. 4, 2007) (This Article’s author is a contributor to For 
the Seventh Generation Blog.); see also Native American Rights Fund & National 
Congress of American Indians, Tribal Supreme Court Project Memorandum 1 (July 
30, 2007), available at http://www.narf.org/sct/caseupdates.pdf (noting that “[d]uring 
the 2006 Term, the Court did not accept any Indian law cases for review”). 
F 
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claims since at least 1988,3 there was cause for some rejoicing in 
the Court’s lack of interest.4  This happiness was short-lived: the 
Court has recently granted certiorari for two cases and has 
already used the first of those to undercut tribal judicial 
authority.5  In the 2005 case City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation of New York,6 general disfavor of Indian claims was 
highlighted when the Court ostensibly protected non-Indian 
property interests and non-Indian governments against the 
dangers of tribal land claims.  But in order to do so, the Court 
abandoned prior precedent and instead relied upon a 
problematic laches theory in ruling against the tribe. 
The commentary on the case has thus far rightly targeted and 
critiqued the Court’s novel and unexpected (it was not even 
briefed by the parties) reliance upon the flawed laches argument, 
which somehow produced an 8–1 majority.  In Sherrill, the Court 
was quite candid in its preferential option for non-Indians over 
Indians,7 despite the Oneida Indian Nation of New York’s ability 
to point to treaty-based rights that would mandate a different 
holding. 
Similarly, the Court asserted without hesitation or analysis 
that non-Indian interests in “justifiable expectations” need to be 
protected from harm resulting from the Court permitting tribally 
 
3 Alex Tallchief Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L. 
REV. 777, 777–78 (2006) (noting that “the general wisdom now is to advise Indian 
tribes to avoid the Supreme Court at all costs,” and identifying “1988 as the turning 
point in the Court’s attitude toward tribal rights”). 
4 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Indian Law Caseload, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Feb. 9, 2007, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=matthew_fletcher. 
5 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 
(2008) (limiting tribal court authority over a nonmember bank doing business in 
Indian country); see also NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND & NATIONAL 
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, Tribal Supreme Court Project Memorandum 
(Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://www.narf.org/sct/updatememos/2008/10-07-
08.pdf. 
6 City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
7 The language reference is to Liberation Theology of the Catholic Church whose 
guiding principle was “a preferential option for the poor.”  Peter M. Cicchino, 
Building on Foundational Myths: Feminism and the Recovery of “Human Nature”: 
A Response to Martha Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 73, 84 
(2000).  Literally applying such an option to the Sherrill litigants is tricky because 
the purchases of the Oneida Indian Nation were financed in part by a highly 
successful gaming operation that greatly enriched the tribe. 
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created checkerboard land ownership patterns.8  This supposed 
harm has been underexplored to date, likely a consequence of 
the academy’s instinctive need to respond to the glaring 
problems with the Court’s core laches argument.  Additionally, 
intellectual acceptance of the parallel critique of checkerboard 
jurisdiction by Indian advocates and the Indian law community 
has arguably led to internalizing and uncritically over-extending 
the complaints against border towns and checkerboard areas.  
That diminished sovereignty over checkerboard areas harms 
Indian tribes does not necessarily mean that the “justifiable 
expectations” of non-Indians are being harmed by tribally 
created checkerboard areas. 
This Article–unlike many Indian law articles–accepts for 
the purpose of the analysis the Court’s vantage point.9  In 
Sherrill, the Court and the City of Sherrill leaders argued that 
permitting the Oneida Indian Nation to unilaterally convert land 
purchased on the market into tribal land would harm non-
Indians.10  In light of this argument, this Article explores what 
assumptions are revealed by the Court’s facile acceptance of this 
argument, and whether non-Indians are harmed by tribal-state 
checkerboard land ownership.  Part I introduces the Sherrill 
dispute, the Court’s holding, and responses to the decision.  Part 
I also provides the necessary backdrop for understanding the 
Court’s assumptions with regard to the harms of Indian land 
ownership.11  Part II investigates the assumptions that the Court 
and academics make about checkerboard areas and towns 
bordering Indian reservations.  Part III presents non-Indian 
reactions to the Oneida Nation’s land claims, using these 
reactions to better understand what non-Indians dislike about 
 
8 Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 199. 
9 As Professor Kristen Carpenter and Ray Halbritter, who is head of the Oneida 
Indian Nation, note, “The question of who can appropriately analyze the 
experiences of American Indian tribes is a complicated one.”  Kristen A. Carpenter 
& Ray Halbritter, Beyond the Ethnic Umbrella and the Buffalo: Some Thoughts on 
American Indian Tribes and Gaming, 5 GAMING L. REV. 311, 327 n.142 (2001) 
(presenting the suggestion that “members of a minority community may be best 
situated to tell the stories of their people”). 
10 Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 200. 
11 I have resisted suggestions that this section be shortened because I want to 
make sure those unfamiliar with this area of law can better understand the Article’s 
later points, but Indian law scholars and others already familiar with Sherrill may 
want to skim this section. 
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Indian land ownership.  Part IV explores the assumption that 
Indian land ownership harms non-Indians.  Basic property law 
often does not protect property owners from harm caused by 
businesses or regulations; similarly, possible harm to non-Indian 
property owners attributable to tribal land ownership does not 
necessarily justify Supreme Court protection.12  Basic property 
law and empirical evidence from Madison County, New York, 
suggests that the Court’s assumption that non-Indians are 
harmed by proximity to Indian land is not justified.  This Article 
in no way seeks to displace laches as the most important and 
most troubling thing done by the Court in Sherrill.  It instead 
seeks to add to our understanding of the abused–and abusive–
logic of the Court’s understanding of Indian property rights. 
I 
INTRODUCTION TO CITY OF SHERRILL, NEW YORK V. ONEIDA 
INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK 
The April 11, 2005, City of Sherrill City Commission meeting 
began on a good note: 
 Mayor Shay opened the meeting by reading a statement 
announcing the United States Supreme Court’s decision with 
the city’s lawsuit against the Oneida Indian Nation of New 
York.  The Supreme Court ruled 8–1 in the favor of the city of 
Sherrill ruling that land purchased by them does not become 
Indian reservation land.  Mayor Shay said it is a great victory 
for Sherrill and the entire area.  Mayor Shay thanked the City’s 
attorney, Ira Sacks, and all his support staff, David Barker and 
Michael Holmes, as well as Dwight Evans and all the previous 
and present city commission that have kept the “fight” going.  
Stu Hill, West Hamilton Ave., was present and told the 
commission he echoed Mayor Shay’s comments.  He wanted to 
commend the city commissioners past and present and the 
administration and Ira Sacks for his pro bono legal work.  
Congratulations to all.
13
 
The revelry continued May 5, 2005, when the City held an Ira 
Sacks appreciation dinner, celebrating the accomplishment of 
 
12 When referring to non-Indians with the corresponding form of property 
interest, this Article uses the labels “property owner” or “landowner” even though 
at some points the Oneida tribe did not consider those labels appropriate.  See 
Arlinda Locklear, Morality and Justice 200 Years After the Fact, 37 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 593, 597 (2003) (attorney for the Oneida tribe noting, “We do not refer to the 
defendants as landowners.  They assert that they own the land, but we deny that.”). 
13 City of Sherrill City Commission, Minutes, Apr. 11, 2005 (emphasis added). 
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the attorney who, on a pro-bono basis, failed to convince only a 
single Justice.14  And in his farewell letter to the community, 
retiring City Manager David O. Barker confidently opined, 
“[t]he City of Sherrill should be proud of the position it took and 
held firm with regards to the Oneida Indians. . . . I am proud we 
stood our ground.”15 
The Indian and Indian law communities were less elated 
about the Court’s ruling.  Indian Country Today, the leading 
pan-Indian newspaper which happens to be owned by the 
Oneida Indian Nation,16 accused the Supreme Court of “making 
political decisions” and going “out of its way” in denying “an 
Indian nation’s right to even buy back its historical and illegally 
taken (stolen) reservation lands.”17  For many Indian law 
academics, while accustomed to judicial setbacks, Sherrill was 
particularly painful.  Professor Joseph Singer noted that he 
reacted to the Court’s reasoning “with a fair amount of 
astonishment and anger.”18  Furthermore, Professor Sarah 
Krakoff wrote that “the opinion is one of the most cringe-
inducing of late . . . .”19  One knows there is frustration when a 
professor entitles a section of a case examination law review 
article simply “Aarrrghhh!” and that is exactly what Professor 
Krakoff felt compelled to do when writing about Sherrill.20 
For those who follow Indian law scholarship, such frustration 
is not entirely surprising.  Prior to Sherrill, Professor Philip 
Frickey observed, “[s]cholars rail–perhaps a better word for it is 
flail–against the trend in the cases.”21  “[F]or some years now,” 
 
14 City of Sherrill Newsl., Community Happenings, Spring 2005. 
15 City of Sherrill Newsl., David O. Barker, An Open Farewell Letter from Our 
Retiring City Manager, Fall 2005. 
16 Editorial, A Plea to the Pope: Rescind the Papal Bulls, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY, May 26, 2006 (acknowledging Oneida ownership of the newspaper). 
17 Editorial, Fundamental Justice Shaken in Iroquois Land Cases, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY, July 7, 2005. 
18 Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred 
Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 611 (2006). 
19 Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A 
Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 5, 6 (2005). 
20 Id. at 10 (title of Part III of her article). 
21 Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and 
Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 
38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 33 (2002). 
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Professor Alex Tallchief Skibine relatedly observed, “I have 
found that teaching Indian law can have a depressing effect . . . . 
due to the Supreme Court decisions I teach in the class.”22  And 
while Professor Krakoff describes her efforts to try “desperately 
to avoid lapsing into unseemly cynicism, bordering on whiny 
sarcasm, when it comes to teaching some of the recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions in the field,” her subsequent 
assertion that this “is not merely the pathetic whine of the sore 
loser,”23 could be unconvincing when the Court so easily comes 
out 8-1 against tribal rights.  In an earlier article, I painted with a 
broad brush what I considered the field’s “standard pattern” of 
scholarship: “a description of how cases used to be decided, 
followed by a description of the wrong way they are currently 
decided.”24  I went on to distinguish such scholarship from 
“simplistic complaint narratives,”25 but by doing so I implicitly 
criticized scholarly whining.  Given the strong version of 
Sherrill’s message, that “the American Court system will no 
longer sympathize with tribes seeking retribution for past 
wrongs,” some complaint, even whining, from advocates for the 
losers seems appropriate.26  The Court’s novel use of laches and 
unexplored assumptions regarding the effects of checkerboard 
areas on non-Indians reveal the decision to be, in the words of 
Professor Robert Porter, “purely political.”27  Such treatment of 
treaty-based rights is worthy of consideration and complaint.28 
 
22 Skibine, supra note 3, at 777. 
23 Krakoff, supra note 19, at 5. 
24 Ezra Rosser, The Trade-off Between Self-Determination and the Trust Doctrine: 
Tribal Government and the Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291, 294 (2005).  
Professor Frickey recently put this much more concretely and eloquently by noting 
that WWJ(M)D–What Would John (Marshall) Do–should not be the 
fundamental question of Indian law, while in the same paragraph also giving credit 
to the inclination underlying standard Indian law scholarship by noting that “[i]n his 
best moments, then, Chief Justice Marshall provided examples of what ‘doing 
Indian law’ should be about.”  Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism 
in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 488 (2005). 
25 Rosser, supra note 24, at 294. 
26 Amy Borgman, Note, Stamping Out the Embers of Tribal Sovereignty: City of 
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation and Its Aftermath, 10 GREAT PLAINS NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 59, 60 (2006) (based upon Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. 
v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
27 Robert Odawi Porter, Sherrill: Feeding America’s Appetite for Land, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY, June 17, 2005. 
28 A good example of scholarship, written prior to Sherrill, that effectively 
combines critical consideration and complaint is law professor and poet Frank 
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The Treaty of Canandaigua recognizes the Oneida Indian 
Nation’s right to 300,000 acres in upstate New York.29  This 1794 
treaty recognized the validity of an earlier land reservation 
between the state of New York and the Oneida Indian Nation in 
1788.30  Despite the Treaty of Canandaigua recognizing the 
Oneida tribe’s right to land it had occupied prior to the 
formation of the country, and despite the Oneida “all[ying] with 
the colonists and [fighting] alongside them in a number of critical 
battles,”31 the Oneida began losing its reserved land to non-
Indians immediately after the Treaty of Canandaigua.32  New 
York’s acquisition of reserved land was remarkably successful, 
“ultimately, by 1920, only 32 acres continued to be held by the 
Oneidas.”33  The U.S. government acquiesced in the actions of 
New York, and multi-generational Oneida complaints about 
U.S. “mistreatment” of the Oneida did not protect the Oneida’s 
territorial integrity provided for in the Treaty of Canandaigua.34 
When the tribe’s complaints did not succeed in restoring its 
land, the Oneida eventually reacted in two ways: they sued 
everyone connected with the tribe’s loss of land, including local 
 
Pommersheim’s Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the Edge of the 
Prairie, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439 (1999).  Professor Pommersheim’s article is his 
analysis of “a series of historically superficial and intellectually deficient Supreme 
Court pronouncements.”  Id. at 442.  Tellingly, he introduces his analysis with a 
more poetic and descriptive sentence that calls attention to the complaints in the 
article: “Reflections transformed into plaintive yowls from the edge of the northern 
plains’ prairie.”  Id. at 441. 
29 City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 203–05 
(2005). 
30 Id.  The United States recognized the 1788 treaty with New York because the 
Nonintercourse Act, which disallowed tribal-state treaties without approval by the 
federal government, was not passed until 1790.  Id. at 204.  For more on the Treaty 
of Canandaigua, see Robert W. Venables, The Treaty of Canandaigua (1794): Past 
and Present, in ENDURING LEGACIES: NATIVE AMERICAN TREATIES AND 
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 45–80 (Bruce E. Johansen ed., 2004); see also 
Michael Matthews, Comment, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation: Balancing 
the Correction of Historical Wrongs with the Convenience of Ignoring Them, 32 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 169, 174–75 (2007) (noting that Congress prohibited these 
state-tribal treaties two years after the Oneida-New York treaty “in order to avoid 
these kinds of land transactions”). 
31 John Tahsuda, The Oneida Land Claim: Yesterday and Today, 46 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1001, 1002 (1998). 
32 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 205; Land Claim Timeline, UTICA OBSERVER 
DISPATCH, May 22, 2007. 
33 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 207. 
34 See id. at 218 n.12. 
ROSSER.FMT 12/1/2008  11:38:24 AM 
182 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 175 
and federal governments and even individual non-Indian 
property owners, and they began open market land purchases 
within the original reservation boundaries.  As Ray Halbritter, 
the Nation Representative of the Oneida Indian Nation of New 
York,35 noted in a post-Sherrill Congressional hearing, the tribe’s 
land claim case is “the largest and oldest” such case and “has 
twice been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.”36  The 
cases Halbritter went on to cite37–Oneida Indian Nation v. 
County of Oneida38 (“Oneida I”) and County of Oneida v. 
Oneida Indian Nation39 (“Oneida II”)–supported the tribe and 
did not foreshadow the Sherrill defeat.40 
Though victories, the Supreme Court cases did not return land 
to the Oneida, and so the tribe began unilaterally reacquiring its 
reservation.41  In 1993, Turning Stone Resort and Casino opened 
and, together with a host of other tribal enterprises also under 
Ray Halbritter’s leadership,42 business success fueled an Oneida 
 
35 Though the title may confuse those not familiar with the tribe, the 
“Representative” is the head of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York.  Oneida 
Indian Nation, Fact Sheet: The Oneida Indian Nation, available at http:// 
www.oneidaindiannation.com/pressroom/factsheets/26864764.html (last visited Oct. 
28, 2008). 
36 Testimony of Ray Halbritter, Nation Representative of the Oneida Indian 
Nation of New York, before the Committee on Natural Resources, U.S. House of 
Representatives, July 14, 2005, available at http://republicans.resourcescommittee 
.house.gov/archives/ii00/archives/109/testimony/2005/rayhalbritter.htm. 
37 Id. 
38 441 U.S. 667 (1974). 
39 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
40 For more on the Oneida land claim cases up until 1991, see GEORGE C. 
SHATTUCK, THE ONEIDA LAND CLAIMS: A LEGAL HISTORY (1991). 
41  See City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 210–
12 (stating that the Oneida reacquired parts of its original land through open-
market transactions). 
42 See Carpenter & Halbritter, supra note 9, at 321–23, for more on why the tribe 
made the choice to found a casino.  See Jay Donald Jerde, Learning to Sell 
Grandmother: Why City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New 
York Should Be Upheld to Preserve Tax-Free Status of Tribal Real Estate 
Acquisitions, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 341, 343 (2005), for a detailing of the business 
interests of the Oneida Indian Nation; see also Fact Sheet: The Oneida Indian 
Nation, supra note 35.  For more on the casino, see Oneida Indian Nation, Fact 
Sheet: Turning Stone Resort and Casino, http://www.oneidaindiannation 
.com/pressroom/factsheets/27429169.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).  See Oneida 
Nation Enterprises, http://www.onenterprises.com/index.php (last visited Nov. 21, 
2008), for the homepage of Oneida Nation Enterprises, with links to the subsidiary 
businesses. 
ROSSER.FMT 12/1/2008  11:38:24 AM 
2008] Protecting Non-Indians from Harm? 183 
land-buying spree.43  In 1990, the Oneida owned only fifty-two 
acres of non-trust land, but by 2006 the tribe owned more than 
17,000 acres, with seventy-seven percent of the land acquired 
since 1998.44  While targeted land purchases at times can go 
undetected,45 the Oneida tribe’s purchases were both impressive 
and noticed.  Non-Indians who did not like the actions of the 
Oneida and other New York tribes banded together to form 
Upstate Citizens for Equality (“UCE”), an organization which 
continues to take a lead role in opposing the Oneida Nation.  
According to UCE, “money lost at the tables in the Turning 
Stone Casino goes in two very destructive directions: new 
purchases of land that erode our tax base, and start-up money 
for new and diverse tax evading businesses.”46  Unfortunately for 
the Oneida, the Supreme Court in Sherrill–a court which has 
never had an Indian member–took their natural non-Indian 
perspective on Oneida land acquisitions, a perspective shared by 
Upstate Citizens for Equality.47 
Sherrill arose when the Oneida Nation refused to pay 
property taxes on parcels of property it had purchased.48  Oneida 
II acknowledged that the Oneida possess aboriginal title to the 
land originally reserved for them.  The tribe then argued, and 
the United States (though ultimately not the Court) agreed, that 
“because the Tribe has now acquired the specific parcels 
involved in this suit in the open market, it has unified fee and 
 
43 See Jerde, supra note 42, at 344. 
44 Letter from S. John Campanie, Madison County Attorney, to Franklin Keel, 
Bureau of Indian Affairs Regional Director (Feb. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.madisoncounty.org/motf/MadCoSJCoin.htm (opposing the Oneida 
application to take the land into trust). 
45 Harvard University, for example, initially concealed its identity when it “spent 
$88 million secretly acquiring 52.6 acres of land in the Allston section of Boston,” 
and only announced the institutional nature of the purchases after they had been 
accomplished.  Sara Rimer, Some Seeing Crimson at Harvard ‘Land Grab,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 1997, at A16. 
46 UPSTATE CITIZENS FOR EQUALITY, FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY AND THE 
ONEIDA LAND CLAIM, at 14 (Dec. 9, 2001), available at http://www.upstate-
citizens.org/fip.pdf. 
47 See Krakoff, supra note 19, at 11 (noting the lack of Indian members on the 
Court through history). 
48  City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 211 
(2005) (“Because the parcels lie within the boundaries of the reservation originally 
occupied by the Oneidas, OIN maintained that the properties are exempt from 
taxation, and accordingly refused to pay the assessed property taxes.”). 
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aboriginal title and may now assert sovereign dominion over the 
parcels.”49  Thus, the tribe was asserting a derivative treaty-
based right to revive “ancient sovereignty piecemeal over each 
parcel.”50  For the Court, the most important part of the tribe’s 
assertion was captured by the modifier “ancient,” and that 
modifier trumped both the tribe’s treaty guarantees and the 
seemingly self-actualizing nature of the tribe’s land reacquisition 
strategy. 
With the exception of Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, the 
Court felt that the amount of time since the Oneida previously 
controlled their land evoked “the doctrines of laches, 
acquiescence, and impossibility, and render[ed] inequitable the 
piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to 
initiate.”51  The Oneida thus could not unite aboriginal and fee 
title because they had lost control of their reservation lands 200 
years before and had waited too long before seeking judicial 
redress.52  In almost poetic language, the Court held that 
“standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice 
preclude the Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that 
long ago grew cold.”53  The Court again relied upon the modifier 
“ancient” to reduce the significance of the Oneida’s reacquired 
land: “OIN’s claim concerns grave, but ancient, wrongs, and the 
relief available must be commensurate with that historical 
reality.”54 
The Court’s reliance on laches–a judicially created (here 
imagined?) statute of limitations on claims–can be critiqued on 
a number of legal grounds.  Professor Krakoff notes that, by 
relying on laches where prior precedent would not support the 
outcome, “the Court has undermined core legal principles 
without having the courage to say it is doing so. . . . [P]erverting 
the core doctrines of law that apply to federal-tribal relations.”55  
 
49 Id. at 213. 
50 Id. at 202. 
51 Id. at 221. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 214 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 Id. at 216 n.11. 
55 Krakoff, supra note 19, at 11.  See id. at 12–17, for critical coverage of the 
Court’s laches argument and the history of the issues involved.  Krakoff’s complaint 
is similar to an earlier one of Dean David Getches: “[The Court] has not directly 
overruled precedent, but it has virtually ignored the Marshall trilogy, which had 
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Similarly, a student note on Sherrill critiqued the Court for 
failing to live up to the requirements of the Indian Trust 
Doctrine.56  These points echo that of Justice Stevens, who in 
dissent wrote that the majority was acting in a way 
“irreconcilable with the principle that only Congress may 
abrogate or extinguish tribal sovereignty.”57  More provocatively 
(Justice Stevens after all did “respectfully dissent”58), Professor 
Singer, author of one of the two leading Property textbooks, 
accuses the Court of having “divorced title from ownership in a 
manner more radical than ever previously done in U.S. law and 
did so by blaming the victim.”59  Professor Singer argued that the 
barriers the Oneida faced in bringing a lawsuit earlier to protect 
their rights make the Court’s laches-based holding 
inappropriate.60 
If Sherrill is a laches decision, the holding is buttressed with 
the Court’s negative perception of checkerboard areas.  During 
oral argument, Justice Scalia made explicit the connection 
between problems that come with alternating control of land and 
the appropriateness of a laches-based decision: 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Smith, isn’t there any principle of 
laches that comes into effect here.  I mean, what you’re asking 
the Court to do is to sanction a very odd checkerboard system 
of jurisdiction in the middle of New York State.  Some parcels 
are the ones the Indians choose to buy and are able to buy are 
called Indian territory and everything else is governed by New 
York state isn’t it?  It’s just a terrible situation as far as 
governance is concerned and part of the blame for the 
 
been the touchstone of nearly all Indian law cases since the first Supreme Court.”  
David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ 
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 274 
(2001). 
56 Borgman, supra note 26, at 59. 
57 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 227. 
59 Singer, supra note 18, at 611.  Singer descriptively expanded upon his 
accusation when he labeled the Court’s blaming actions “Kafkaesque.”  Id. at 612. 
60 Id. at 615–27; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, “Now What the Hell You Gonna Do in 
Those Days?” A Research Note on Practical Barriers to Indian Land Claims (Mich. 
St. U. Coll. of L., Working Paper No. 06-07, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1128153; accord Matthews, supra note 30, at 180–82; see also Locklear, 
supra note 12, at 601 (the delay in filing lawsuits “is not a function of the fact that 
the Indian people slept on their rights, it is a function of the State’s own duplicity in, 
first of all, taking the land illegally, and secondly, doing everything in its power over 
the last 150 years to refuse to address and set right those wrongs”). 
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situation we’re in is that the Oneidas did not complain about 
this for 170 years.
61
 
Justice Scalia’s words were to resurface in the opinion.  By 
using laches to underpin the Court’s rejection of the tribe’s 
unification of title theory, the Court turned to a rationale “which 
[was] never presented or briefed by the parties,” and did so in a 
way that betrayed the Court’s “pragmatic concerns” regarding 
possible Indian jurisdiction over the land.62  Scholarship so far 
has narrowed in on the problems with the Court’s use of laches, 
but the Court itself incorporated into its laches argument a focus 
on checkerboard areas to support its full holding: 
Today, we decline to project redress for the Tribe into the 
present and future, thereby disrupting the governance of 
central New York’s counties and towns.  Generations have 
passed during which non-Indians have owned and developed 
the area that once composed the Tribe’s historic reservation.  
And at least since the middle years of the 19th century, most of 
the Oneidas have resided elsewhere.  Given the longstanding, 
distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants, 
the regulatory authority constantly exercised by New York 
State and its counties and towns, and the Oneidas’ long delay 
in seeking judicial relief against parties other than the United 
States, we hold that the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its 
ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at 
issue.  The Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins of 
government and cannot regain them through open-market 
purchases from current titleholders.
63
 
There is always a danger when commenting on a bad decision, 
and Sherrill–even with eight votes–certainly is a bad decision.  
The problem lies in drawing too heavily on the Court for the 
shape of subsequent analysis.  Such reliance risks reinforcing so-
called “legal arguments” that may be better described as excuses 
rather than consequences of prior precedent or legal principles–
 
61 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197 (No. 03-855) 
(Scalia, J., questioning Michael R. Smith on Behalf of Respondents). 
62 Borgman, supra note 26, at 60.  The Court was aware that laches was not one 
of the original issues in the case and felt the need to explain in a footnote why the 
case was resolved “on considerations not discretely identified in the parties’ briefs.”  
City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214 n.8.  Justice Breyer revealed some of the pragmatic 
concerns he had during oral argument when he speculated that the land at stake 
might be “worth a trillion dollars.”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 61, at 
29.  A similar pragmatic monetary concern arguably helps explain the Court’s 
treatment of Indian breach of trust cases.  See Rosser, supra note 24, at 300–01. 
63 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 202–03. 
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despite using fancy words understood only by lawyers 
(“laches”).  In considering Sherrill, for example, there is a good 
article waiting to be written focusing on a close analysis of the 
Oneida’s pre- and post-Nonintercourse Act treaties, an analysis 
that the Court chose not to pursue.64  Yet, just as the Court’s 
flawed imposition of a laches limitation forced a scholarly 
response, the Court’s revealed assumptions regarding 
checkerboard areas and their harm to non-Indians also merit 
response. 
II 
CHECKERBOARD AREAS 
Indian law scholars and the Supreme Court seemingly agree 
on at least one thing: checkerboard areas are bad.  Really bad.  
According to the Court, “A checkerboard of alternating state 
and tribal jurisdiction in New York State–created unilaterally at 
OIN’s behest–would seriously burden the administration of 
state and local governments and would adversely affect 
landowners neighboring the tribal patches.”65  Likewise, 
according to Professor Frickey, checkerboard areas are a 
“dysfunctional . . . pattern of land ownership,”66 and 
checkerboarding “makes the delivery of government services a 
nightmare.”67  Similarly, Professor Rebecca Tsosie asserts that 
checkerboard jurisdiction “is inherently unworkable.”68 
Behind the apparent agreement on checkerboard areas lurks a 
critical difference between the Court and Indian law academics: 
perspective.  Indian law scholars tend to look at things from a 
tribal perspective; thus, checkerboard areas are primarily 
problematic because of judicial rules that limit tribal sovereignty 
 
64 See id. at 215 n.9 (noting that the Court was not basing its decision on the 
interpretation of treaty language); see also Locklear, supra note 12, at 596 
(describing New York’s land acquisition treaties as examples of “coercion in 
virtually every circumstance”). 
65 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 219–20 (internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted). 
66 Frickey, supra note 21, at 7. 
67 Id. at 33. 
68 Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native 
Sovereignty and Property in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291, 1297 (2001); see also 
Getches, supra note 55, at 277 (citing the “practical concerns” of having zoning 
sovereignty be dependent upon property ownership). 
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over those areas.69  The Court assumes the opposite perspective: 
it disfavors tribal-state checkerboard areas because of perceived 
harm to non-Indians, and this disfavor arguably explains 
Sherrill.70  Published prior to Sherrill, Professor Frickey’s 
summary of prior Indian case law arguably foretells the 
majority’s position: 
It seems apparent that the Court has been motivated primarily 
by two practical factors: a desire to protect nonmembers from 
tribal regulation (by excluding regions with lots of 
nonmembers from the reservation), and a desire to allow states 
and their subdivisions to administer public services efficiently, 
especially where nonmembers are the beneficiaries of these 
services.
71
 
The Court’s singular focus on non-Indian concerns betrays its 
own corresponding indifference to Indian ideas regarding 
resolution of disputes between tribes and non-Indian entities.72  
What remains unexplored is what exactly the Court is protecting 
non-Indians from and whether there is a need for such 
protection. 
Perspective helps explain the Court’s treatment of the Oneida 
claims.  Professor Singer noted, “it takes chutzpah for the 
Supreme Court to complain about the untenability of 
checkerboard jurisdiction when it was the Supreme Court that 
created checkerboard jurisdiction.”73  But in Sherrill, the Court 
never questioned the idea that non-Indians suffer from 
checkerboarding.  Many problems with the Sherrill decision have 
 
69 As Professor Royster noted prior to City of Sherrill, “the Court has focused on 
non-Indian fee ownership within Indian country . . . as a justification for divesting 
tribes of territorial sovereignty.”  Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 29 (1995). 
70 Court prioritization of non-Indian perceptions of harm reflects the Court’s 
general tendency to “disfavor interests of minorities when they conflict with 
interests of the majority in society.”  Getches, supra note 55, at 323.  Dean Getches 
identified this as part of the Court’s strong inclination “to follow what the Justices 
believe to be the mainstream values of American society.”  Id. at 321. 
71 Frickey, supra note 21, at 30. 
72 See Krakoff, supra note 19, at 6 (concluding that “the only unifying theme 
running through recent Indian law cases is that the Court either does not care 
about, or is hostile to, the interests of American Indians”). 
73 Singer, supra note 18, at 609; accord Tsosie, supra note 68, at 1296 (“Rather 
than trying to facilitate the efficient administration of reservation lands by Indian 
tribes, the Court’s opinions have increasingly determined that Indian nations retain 
very limited jurisdictional authority over non-Indians on fee lands.”). 
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been identified: Justices not sticking with their preference for 
“original intent” reasoning in this context, poor reading of the 
Nonintercourse Act’s statutory language, the Court’s ironic 
checkerboard jurisdiction critique, the irony of the Court’s 
judicial activism in defining the tribal-state relationship, and the 
argument that non-Indians had justifiable expectations when 
New York never acquired valid title.74  But perhaps the list 
should also include the Court’s unfounded ease in repetitively 
assuming injury to non-Indians if the Oneida reasserted 
sovereignty over purchased land. 
Sherrill begs the question whether the outcome would have 
been different had the demographic facts been more favorable, 
and consequently, the Court not as focused on protecting non-
Indians from checkerboard areas.75  In Sherrill, the Court noted 
that the case involved an area in which “over 99% of the 
population in the area is non-Indian,” and that even with the 
tribe’s land acquisition, Oneida land represented “less than 1.5% 
of the counties’ total area.”76  Although writing about Oliphant, 
Professor Royster’s words apply in part to the Sherrill Court’s 
use of demographic characteristics in a laches opinion, “[w]hile 
these facts were technically irrelevant to the holding, their 
influence on the Court’s decision is suspect.”77  In fact, the 
Sherrill Court made clear that the demographic facts did play a 
 
74 Singer, supra note 18, at 608–10. 
75 This question was suggested by a parallel question regarding the quintessential 
“bad” facts case, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), raised by 
Professor Royster: 
 The unanswerable but intriguing question is whether the Court would 
have held differently had it been presented with “good” facts: a similar 
crime occurring on a reservation that was virtually all trust land and with 
an overwhelmingly Indian population.  Given the racist basis of the 
decision in Oliphant, it is likely the Court would have ruled against tribal 
jurisdiction in any case, but it would have had a harder time justifying its 
decision without the effects of allotment on the Suquamish Reservation. 
Royster, supra note 69, at 45 n.240.  Professor Frickey notes that the Oliphant Court 
did not limit its opinion to the bad facts and “[i]nstead of denying this tribe 
jurisdiction because of the dreadful circumstances, the Court announced a general 
rule: tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”  Frickey, supra note 21, at 
22. 
76 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 211 (2005). 
77 Royster, supra note 69, at 45. 
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role by stating that such demographics “may create ‘justifiable 
expectations’” in the minds of non-Indians.78 
A.  Framework for Understanding Sherrill 
The Court’s assumptions regarding the land claimed by the 
Oneida can be explored by borrowing from a framework 
developed to explain diminishment cases.  Because the Oneida 
were attempting to reacquire land rather than trying to defend 
tribal control over existing reservation land, Sherrill is not 
explicitly a diminishment of tribal sovereignty case.  Yet the 
Sherrill opinion fits the characteristics Professor Gloria 
Valencia-Weber highlights as governing the Court’s 
consideration of such cases: 
a.  the land characteristics, size, configuration and history–
real and attributed–of the tribal trust lands and the lands 
included within the Indian country statute, individual 
allotments, fee lands, and dependent Indian communities; 
b.  the method of governance and specific activities on the 
disputed land; that is, what tribal governments and entities do, 
as well as the behavior of individuals; and 
c.  the people on the land; specifically, what legal distinctions 
can be made among the persons who inhabit and use the 
land.
79
 
Professor Valencia-Weber’s categories provide a good 
framework for considering how the possibility of checkerboard 
areas impacted the Court. 
1.  Land Characteristics and History 
Though the history of non-Indian land possession is the land 
characteristic the Court focused upon, it also noted that the 
land’s characteristics have changed through “development of 
every type imaginable [that] has been ongoing for more than two 
centuries.”80  The Court used the “dramatic changes in the 
character of the properties” as a factor in disallowing the tribe to 
unify title.81  Drawing on language of an earlier era, the Court 
explained: “[T]he properties here involved have greatly 
 
78 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 215–16 (citation omitted). 
79 Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest 
Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1995). 
80 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 219 (citation omitted). 
81 Id. at 216–17. 
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increased in value since the Oneidas sold them 200 years ago.  
Notably, it was not until lately that the Oneidas sought to regain 
ancient sovereignty over land converted from wilderness to 
become part of cities like Sherrill.”82  Yet, the Court is careful 
not to explain why such changes are relevant.  In a less politically 
correct environment, the Court was free to say what was just 
beneath the surface of the Court’s concern for 200 years of 
development: “To leave [Indians] in possession of their country, 
was to leave the country a wilderness. . . .”83 
2. Tribal and Local Governance 
The Sherrill Court gave less attention to tribal governance of 
the land since tribal tax liability was the only governance issue 
raised.  The majority felt there would be “problems associated 
with upsetting New York’s long-exercised sovereignty over the 
area.”84  The Court acknowledged that its motivation for 
allowing local taxation of Oneida land was partly because of its 
concern that the tribe would not protect area landowners 
through the same “local zoning or other regulatory controls” 
that had been in place.85  In contrast, the lower court dismissed 
the anti-tribal argument that unifying title might upset settled 
expectations.  Such an argument, the lower court reasoned, 
“only begs the question whether the city is authorized to tax the 
properties.”86  The Court’s concern is somewhat remarkable 
because during oral argument the tribe had conceded regulatory 
and taxing authority over non-Indians to the nontribal 
governments.87  Of course, tribal governance over its own land 
might still “frustrate[] the efforts of both sovereigns to segregate 
 
82 Id. at 215. 
83 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 590 (1823). 
84 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 216 n.11; see also supra note 71 and accompanying 
text. 
85 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 219–20 (citations omitted). 
86 Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 157 (2d Cir. 
2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
87 Transcipt of Oral Argument, supra note 61, at 30–31.  In his dissent, Justice 
Stevens called attention to the limited scope of the Oneida claim: “This case 
involves an Indian tribe’s claim to tax immunity on its own property located within 
its reservation.  It does not implicate the tribe’s immunity from other forms of state 
jurisdiction, nor does it concern the tribe’s regulatory authority over property 
owned by non-Indians within the reservation.”  City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 222 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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land uses which are incompatible,”88 but the Court’s fears 
regarding tribal governance seem to go beyond the fear that 
tribal control will hamper rational land use planning.  The City 
of Sherrill’s attorney played on such fears during oral argument: 
“It’s more than just the interference, the issue of taxation, the 
issue of sovereignty is whether a gas station is going to blow up 
or burn down.”89  It seems hard to imagine that the Court would 
permit such speculation about exploding gas stations if this were, 
for instance, a simple regulatory authority dispute between 
Minneapolis and St. Paul. 
3.  Legal Distinctions Among People 
The Court’s explicit consideration of the types of people living 
on land affected by the Oneida claim is limited to the Court’s 
introductory observation that ninety-nine percent of the people 
are non-Indian.  The Court’s limited demographic discussion fits 
generally with its “rather blithe dismissal of tribal authority over 
significant non-Indian populations.”90 
B.  Disfavor of Checkerboard Areas 
Having considered the categories guiding the Court when it 
diminishes tribal authority, it is now time to turn to possible 
explanations for the Court’s disfavor of checkerboard areas.  
There is no way to know what role the Justices’ subconscious 
thoughts played in forming their assumptions regarding Indians 
and Indian governance capacity.91  Given the “legacy of 
allotment,” presented most fully in Judith Royster’s so-entitled 
article,92 checkerboard areas are prevalent in Indian country.93  
 
88 Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of 
Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 1, 74 (1993). 
89 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 61, at 9–10. 
90 Pommersheim, supra note 28, at 443. 
91 While this sort of background knowledge is most famously explored in terms of 
racism, in the case of Indian authority over non-Indians, racism can be coupled with 
non-race-based matters of common knowledge regarding checkerboard areas and 
interactions between whites and Indians.  See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
317 (1987). 
92 Royster, supra note 69. 
93 See, e.g., Federico Cheever, Confronting Our Shared Legacy of Incongruous 
Land Ownership: Notes for a Research Agenda, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1039, 1040 
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Non-Indian interactions with Indians in checkerboard areas and 
in associated reservation border towns are largely responsible 
for forming society’s knowledge, or at least a set of shared 
assumptions, regarding Indians.  For the Court, perhaps, such 
interactions illustrate the dangers of allowing tribal land 
acquisition to create checkerboard areas. 
For example, Marc Gaede’s book of photographs, 
Bordertowns, captures the darker side of towns that bridge 
reservation and off-reservation life.94  The title page photo, 
“Passed out in Winslow,” makes way for scenes of derelict bars, 
drunks in police holding tanks, and alcohol-related injuries and 
deaths.95  The problem with Gaede’s photographic presentation 
is its one-dimensional nature, focusing only on the seedy and 
shocking. 
When one talks with non-Indians who have never been to a 
reservation, the two things they “know” about Indians are that 
they are alcoholics and have casinos.  Bordertowns arguably 
reinforces such “knowledge.”  Another book, Ceremony, 
describes Gallup, New Mexico, through the eyes of a drunk 
forced to sleep under bridges.96  If you are Anglo and park your 
car in any of the Navajo Nation shopping centers, you often will 
be approached by ada’adla*ni*gi*i, the Navajo word for those 
who drink alcohol.97  They approach out of a mix of boredom 
 
(2006) (“Most western states contain Indian reservations whittled down or hollowed 
out by the allotment acts of the late nineteenth century.”); Christopher A. Karns, 
Note, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian 
Nation: State Taxation As a Means of Diminishing the Tribal Land Base, 42 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1213, 1224 (1993) (noting that “many reservations today are composed of 
both fee-patented and trust lands, resulting in what is often referred to as a 
‘checkerboard pattern’”) (quoting Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 430 (1989)); Jessica A. Shoemaker, Comment,  
Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment, Fractionation, and the Indian Land 
Tenure Problem, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 729, 755 (2003) (“In the current state of Indian 
Country, the tribal land base is so eroded that the courts now consider it a 
‘checkerboard’ with just a small percentage of the land still held by Indians or the 
tribe.”). 
94 BORDERTOWNS: PHOTOGRAPHS BY MARC GAEDE (Marnie Walker Gaede 
ed., 1988). 
95 Id. 
96 LESLIE MARMON SILKO, CEREMONY (Penguin Books, 1986). 
97 The Diné language includes sounds and letters not found in English.  Here, “’” 
represents a glottal stop and “*” a high tone.  The Diné language is primarily an 
oral language, but does have its own alphabet.  Spelling courtesy of Zelma King, my 
stepmother who has taught Diné at Navajo Community College.  E-mail from 
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and desperation, fueled by alcoholism, in hopes of some sort of 
help to feed their addiction or cope with its consequences.  A 
recent newspaper clipping is representative of the dangers of 
limited and specific non-Indian/Indian interactions.  When a 
New York Times travel writer stopped in Pine Ridge, South 
Dakota, J. T. Kills Crow “approached [him] almost as soon as 
[he] stepped out of [his] car.”98  After touring nearby Wounded 
Knee, J. T. and the reporter drank “beer from plastic cups (Pine 
Ridge is officially dry, so you can’t be seen with a can)” before 
the reporter bought two cases of Hurricane malt liquor, which   
J. T. was still drinking when the reporter went to sleep.99  The 
next day, the reporter “drove away with [his] windows wide-
open to air out the smell of spilled beer,” while J. T. slept.100 
The oft-repeated social narrative of Indian alcoholism draws 
its power and authority from the very limited contacts between 
non-Indians and Indians.  The first and sometimes only Indian 
that non-Indians meet too often is the passed out Indian, or the 
helpful approaching adla*anii.101  Just as non-Indians falsely 
extrapolate general casino wealth from their experiences with 
the small subset of tribes with massive gaming operations, 
border towns and checkerboard areas are similarly creating 
unfounded societal “knowledge” of Indians.  This process of 
making undue conclusions from limited data taints societal 
knowledge and creates a distorted understanding of Indians.  
Similarly, during oral argument, the attorney for the City of 
Sherrill attempted to use a single difficult experience involving 
Indian land regulation to call into question the zoning choices 
and regulatory trustworthiness of an entirely separate tribe.102  
 
James Rosser to Ezra Rosser, Assistant Professor, American University 
Washington College of Law (Aug. 5, 2008) (on file with author). 
98 Matt Gross, Scraping by with a South Dakota Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, 
available at http://travel.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/travel/27frugal.html. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 It should be noted that this problem is not necessarily about Indians.  Rather, 
it may reflect the general phenomenon that any town selling alcohol next to a dry 
area will have a disproportionate number of drunks because the customer base is 
being drawn from a larger area. 
102 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 61, at 25–26 (Caitlin J. Halligan on 
Behalf of the Petitioner) (“For example, another tribe relying on the decision here 
purchased land within its original land claim area that’s just 300 yards from a local 
high school and have begun operation of a gaming hall there.”).  For more on the 
dangers of applying rules applicable to all tribes, see Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and 
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Given the Court’s antagonism to Indian governance and Indian 
regulation of non-Indians in checkerboard areas, societal 
“knowledge” of Indians formed by too few observations seems 
to be subtly impacting the Court, leading it to exaggerate the 
harm to non-Indians associated with checkerboard areas. 
C.  Advantages of Checkerboard Areas 
Paradoxically, the Sherrill Court is aware of the principal 
reasons why non-Indians arguably would not have been harmed 
had the Court allowed Oneida tax immunity; the Court simply 
failed to fully develop the logical economic consequences of an 
Oneida victory in the case.  During oral argument, Justice Scalia 
noted two very interesting points.  First, because land purchased 
by the Oneida would not be subject to tax if the tribe’s 
arguments had been accepted, it would have been “a lot easier 
for [the Oneida Nation] to buy it because it’s much less 
expensive for them to hold that land.”103  Second, that “current 
owners can sell [their land] to somebody else.”104  By the time of 
the opinion however, Justice Scalia and seven other justices had 
seemingly forgotten that “[n]o non-Indians would be ousted 
from their lands” and that “[n]o enormous bill would have to be 
paid by Sherrill.”105  Instead, the majority simply noted that “the 
impracticability of returning to Indian control land that 
generations earlier passed into numerous private hands.”106  
Disingenuously, the majority clouds what is currently at stake 
 
the Academic: The Dangerous Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 141 (2006), available at www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/ 
dec05/rosser.pdf. 
103 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 61, at 14 (J. Kennedy questioning Ira 
S. Sacks on Behalf of the Petitioner). 
104 Id. at 7 (J. Scalia questioning Michael R. Smith on Behalf of Respondents). 
105 Krakoff, supra note 19, at 16.  Professor Krakoff explains further in a 
footnote: 
 Even with regard to this fairness issue, the Court overlooks facts on the 
ground.  The Oneida Indian Nation maintains a grant program to 
compensate local governments for lost revenues.  The program is not a 
perfect substitute for reliable income flows from taxation, but in the 
subjective mix of factors that can be considered when determining whether 
equitable relief is warranted, the Court should have at least acknowledged 
it. 
Id. at 16 n.105 (internal citations omitted). 
106 City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 219 
(2005). 
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while highlighting the fact that the Oneida unsuccessfully 
“attempted to join as defendants, inter alia, approximately 
20,000 private landowners, and to obtain declaratory relief that 
would allow the Oneidas to eject these landowners.”107  It is left 
to Justice Stevens to remind the Court in his dissent that current 
non-Indian property owners are facing neither ejectment nor 
damage claims.108 
The juxtaposition of Justice Scalia’s observations during oral 
argument and the Court’s disregard for the consequences of his 
observations shows the Sherrill opinion to be strikingly short-
sighted.  Had the tribe won the case, non-Indian property 
owners would still be able to possess their property and could 
still have sold their property to whoever offered the most 
money.  Justice Scalia is correct that tax immunity would lower 
the tribe’s property ownership costs, and therefore make buying 
land easier for the tribe.  This is true provided that the tribe is 
not subject to a liquidity constraint, which is unlikely here where 
the tribe is bankrolling its purchases with casino profits.  How 
might a current non-Indian property owner “experience” the 
tribe’s ease of purchasing property?  Through a higher sales 
price for their property.  Ironically, the Court’s ruling harms 
non-Indian property owners by making non-Indian land less 
marketable to the tribe, which had been the deep-pocketed 
purchaser. 
Even accepting that societal understandings, accurate or not, 
of ineffective Indian land use and regulation impact property 
values,109 non-Indian property owners located in checkerboard 
areas may still be better off after a tribe acquires land than they 
were before such (re)acquisition.  At one extreme are properties 
surrounded by tribal land.  Despite the Court’s actual holding in 
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,110 the owner of “a very small 
island of fee land” clearly benefited greatly from being 
 
107 Id. at 210. 
108 Id. at 224 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
109 Professor Angela Riley argues in a recent article that “the vast majority of 
evidence–often ignored by critics–indicates that many Indian nations are already 
engaged in good governance.”  Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1062 (2007). 
110 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
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surrounded by and “located on the Navajo Nation.”111  Similarly, 
even close to reservation borders, developers can use fee status 
within Indian country as a selling point, increasing prices 
because of the area’s shortage of fee land.  A billboard for 
Karigan Estates in Window Rock, Arizona, reflects the unusual 
value fee land can have if located within a reservation: the 
billboard reads, “Karigan Estates: Where you OWN your 
land.”112  As the billboard suggests, even individual Indians living 
in checkerboard areas often prefer buying fee land–for their 
individual ownership and not for conversion to trust status–
because of real or perceived advantages in securing the various 
approvals needed to use land.113  Rather than being harmed, 
which is what the Court assumes to always be the result of 
(tribally created) checkerboarding, current non-Indian property 
owners can benefit in the most direct way–financially–from 
owning fee land located in Indian country. 
More work needs to be done to quantify the effect tribal land 
acquisition programs have on non-Indian small property owners.  
But given the Court’s self-assured, and uncritical, assertion of 
harm in Sherrill, it is enough for the moment to disprove the 
inherent necessity of harm to non-Indian property owners.114  By 
focusing on a group convinced that Indian property acquisition 
harms non-Indians, the assumptions that surround Indian 
ownership and control can be better understood. 
 
111 Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the 
Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1175–76 (2004). 
112 Photo taken March 2007 and on file with the author.  For landowners not in 
Indian country, fee simple status is not a typical selling point used to advertise a 
property. 
113 This real or perceived advantage is facilitated by the Court’s prioritization of 
the interests of fee land over “tribal interests in uniform regulation of land.”  Tsosie, 
supra note 68, at 1296; see also Ezra Rosser, This Land Is My Land, This Land Is 
Your Land: Markets and Institutions for Economic Development on Native 
American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 245, 288–90 (2005) (describing institutional 
constraints that can limit and delay land development on Indian reservations). 
114 A much stronger argument could be made that incomers and future 
generations of non-Indians would be harmed had the Court allowed unilateral land 
reacquisition.  However, by its own terms the Court based its holding on harm to 
non-Indians already in the area affected by the Oneida land purchases, and, as Part 
III suggests, “harm” must be placed in context of both the rights guaranteed to 
Indians and the limited assurances any individual has in a fixed set of property 
relations.  Additionally, following any Court allowance for unilateral tribal land 
acquisition, incomers would be on notice of the relevant rules, reducing their ability 
to claim they suffered a recognizable harm. 
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III 
NON-INDIAN RESISTANCE TO INDIAN LAND CLAIMS 
Indian purchases and assertions of sovereignty over acquired 
land can make non-Indians fearful that this change in land 
ownership and control will harm “ordinary” non-tribal owners.  
The Oneida Indian Nation’s push to reacquire land within the 
tribe’s original reservation boundaries faced organized resistance 
from non-Indian property owners who felt threatened.  One 
group, UCE, became the voice of non-Indian opposition to 
Oneida land acquisition, providing an institutional foundation 
for enduring resistance and for the emergence of opposition 
leaders.  After the Oneida joined 20,000 private landowners to 
their land claim suit, tensions rose quickly, leading to everything 
from protests to racism to death threats directed against the 
Oneida.  Non-Indian landowners’ fears of land loss or decreases 
in value helped fuel this tension, but non-Indians also were 
protesting perceived unfairness of Indian businesses and of the 
sudden increase in wealth of their formerly poor Indian 
neighbors.  Though Sherrill was explicitly about a land claim, 
non-Indian opposition surrounding the case was not limited to 
Oneida land acquisition.  Opponents also questioned the 
continued appropriateness of Indian sovereignty, and did so 
while simultaneously asserting a complete separation from the 
past wrongs committed against Indians.115 
A.  Upstate Citizens for Equality 
After more than a decade of failed settlement negotiations, 
the Oneida Nation, with the support of the U.S. government, 
attempted to add private landowners to its land claim suit.116  
 
115 As the discussion of the racism and death threats makes clear, the wrongs 
committed against Indians are not merely historical, they are ongoing.  
Nevertheless, here the focus is on the innocence or responsibility of non-Indians for 
the wrongs of prior generations. 
116 Beverly Gage, Indian Country, NY: Oneida Indian Nation Seeks to Reclaim 
Land in Upstate New York, NATION, Nov. 27, 2000, at 11.  Who was at fault for the 
failure to reach a negotiated settlement remains a matter of dispute in the area.  See 
Rocco DiVeronica, Letter to the Editor, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), June 9, 
2005, at 26 (“The New York Oneidas have refused to participate in good faith 
negotiations despite the likelihood that they will lose their casino.”). 
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The decision galvanized support for the nascent UCE.117  
Although the goal was to “pressure the state into a 
settlement,”118 joining the private landowners to the suit 
suddenly made the Oneida land claim much “more personal, and 
a lot more controversial” in that part of New York.119  As the 
Christian Science Monitor reported, the atmosphere could at 
best be characterized as “unneighborly.”120  Those sued reacted 
to being sued and flocked to UCE: “Scott Peterman, president of 
Upstate Citizens for Equality, likes to joke that the Oneidas’ suit 
against local landowners was the best thing that ever happened 
to his organization.”121 
Oneida opposition and UCE support manifested itself in ways 
both public and private.  Right after private landowners were 
joined to the suit, “UCE and other landowners’ groups staged a 
massive motorcade encircling the Turning Stone, with as many 
as 5,000 local residents protesting the Oneidas’ legal 
maneuvers.”122  According to Oneida-owned Indian Country 
Today, UCE managed to “threaten[] and cajol[e] their way into 
the public limelight as a dominant voice,” bringing rallies, 
newsletters, and lawsuits to the controversy,123 and obtaining a 
 
117 UCE was formed in 1997.  Upstate Citizens for Equality Homepage, 
http://www.upstate-citizens.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).  One of the founders was 
Judge David K. Reed, who ultimately was investigated by the state Commission on 
Judicial Conduct and forced to resign from his Town Justice position because of his 
involvement with UCE and possible bias against the Oneida.  Justice, Focus of 
Probe, Resigns His Post in Verona, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Apr. 13, 
1999, at B1; see also Paul Lipkowitz, Oneidas Ask State to Investigate Judge: Their 
Complaint Involves a Verona Town Justice’s Leadership of Upstate Citizens for 
Equality, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Feb. 24, 1998, at B1.  This section 
focuses on non-Indian reactions to the Oneida land claims, but it should be noted 
that many other tribal land claims have inspired non-Indian resistance.  See, e.g., 400 
Rally Against Reservation Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1993, at B7 (describing a 
protest to Mashantucket Pequot land claims). 
118 David W. Chen, Begrudging the Neighbors Their Good Luck: Suit by Newly 
Rich Oneidas Stirs Up Other Resentments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at B1. 
119 Diana Louise Carter, Suddenly Rich, and Resented, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT 
AND CHRON., May 30, 1999, at A1. 
120 Stacy A. Teicher, Hostility Builds over Indian Land Claim in N.Y., CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 7, 1999, at 3. 
121 Gage, supra note 116. 
122 Id.  This tactic was used later the same year to protest proposed Cayuga 
settlements.  Lina Katz, Who Owns the Land?, ITHACA J., Aug. 13, 1999, at A1. 
123 Editorial, Hidden Agendas and Seeking Justice, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
(Oneida, N.Y.), Oct. 26, 2005. 
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status “far beyond their numbers.”124  Both the Oneida and UCE 
agree on one thing: despite how hard it is to know what 
influences judges, the Indian land claims lawsuits were likely 
influenced by UCE.125  The level of support UCE generated 
among non-Indians is perhaps most evident from the grassroots-
type fund-raising that supported the organization.  UCE’s first 
fund-raiser was a garage sale126 that became an annual tradition; 
UCE also raised money with an ongoing can and bottle drive.127  
When you add in a bake sale, UCE seems to be supported both 
in their public demonstrations and private fund-raising by a 
broad base of ordinary non-Indians.128 
Controversy surrounds UCE in part because its in-your-face 
attention-grabbing tactics at times were infused with racism or 
threats of violence against Indian tribes and tribal leaders in 
upstate New York.  At a crowded UCE meeting after private 
landowners were joined to the suit, a state assemblyman claimed 
that he kept his hair cut short for fear of being “scalped.”129  
Though the assemblyman’s comments were labeled “deplorable 
 
124 Fundamental Justice, supra note 17. 
125 See Staff interview of Richard Tallcot, secretary of the Cayuga-Seneca chapter 
of UCE, UCE Official: “It’s Not Over,” POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), July 11, 
2005, at B5 (Question: “Has the UCE had influence on land-claim court rulings?”  
Answer: “You never know how much influence you really have, because you’ll 
never be told directly.  Definitely, we’ve had influence politically.  And I know that 
judges read newspapers.”) [hereinafter Tallcot interview]; Fundamental Justice, 
supra note 17 (“These organized groups talk and influence media regularly . . . . 
Thus, their issues are the ones that get discussed as primary in media and by 
policymakers.  Thus, their points of view are most likely to resonate with high 
judges and their clerks as well.”); see also Matthews, supra note 30, at 186 (“[T]he 
Supreme Court appears to have succumbed to political pressures to refrain from 
inconveniencing ‘innocent’ landowners.”). 
126 Dave Tobin, Items Sold, Ideas Swapped: Garage Sale Helps Group Fund Fight 
Against Land Claim, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Oct. 3, 1999, at B1. 
127 Tallcot interview, supra note 125; see also Scott Rapp, Paint Sprayed on UCE 
Signs: Upstate Citizens for Equality Puts Up Reward for Help in Solving Vandalism, 
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Dec. 13, 2003, at B1 (reporting that in 
December 2003 someone stole some of the UCE’s returnable cans and bottles). 
128 See Upstate Citizens for Equality Web site, UCE Bottle Drive and Bake Sale, 
http://www.upstate-citizens.org/BottleCanDrive.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).  
Another fund-raising possibility ironically raised by Richard, secretary of the 
Cayuga-Seneca chapter of UCE: “We might see if we can try some bingo.”  Tobin, 
supra note 126. 
129 Editorial, Childish Slur: A Utica Assemblyman Betrays an Ugly Sense of 
Humor, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Jan. 6, 1999.  UCE President Scott 
Peterman in the same editorial is quoted dismissing critiques of the scalping 
comment by saying that no one took the “joke” seriously.  Id. 
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words” by the editorial board of a local non-Indian paper,130 the 
assemblyman was nonplussed: “Tell them to grow up . . . . I’m 
sick and tired of having the Oneida nation, every time anyone 
says anything, saying it’s racist.”131  An Oneida spokesperson 
later argued that the fact the assemblyman “felt comfortable 
uttering [the comment] at a meeting of the Upstate Citizens for 
Equality is further proof that this organization is a hate 
group.”132  Later in the same year, UCE President Scott 
Peterman defended the group by saying “[w]e are not a bunch of 
crazy subversives.”133  In rejecting the hate-group label, he called 
UCE “a coffee group.”134  Yet as The Nation reported in 2000, 
“posts on the UCE electronic discussion board regularly contain 
choice racial remarks, such as ‘Kiss my lily white UCE ass!!!’”135 
Using violence-laced words or images makes it difficult to 
distinguish UCE rhetoric and anti-Indian opposition from 
threats worthy of a police response.136  Billboards and signs blur 
the line between opposition and threats–“[o]ne, depicting a man 
pointing a shotgun, challenges the tribe’s leader [Ray Halbritter] 
to ‘come get your rent.’”137  In the same vein, cardboard mock 
“Patriot” missiles bearing the warning “Heads up, Ray” 
appeared.138  Anti-Oneida feeling reached a dangerous point 
when local media received an anonymous letter, said to be from 
 
130 Id. 
131 Michelle Breidenbach, Tribe Says Remark Racist: Oneidas Say Assemblyman 
David Townsend Owes His Constituents an Apology, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, 
N.Y.), Dec. 23, 1998, at B1; see also Hart Seely & Michelle Breidenbach, Uncivil 
Civil Claim: Hate Mail, Name-Calling, Threats Fly As Indians Sue, POST-
STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Sept. 26, 1999, at A1 (“Scott Peterman, president of 
Upstate Citizens for Equality has received hate mail.  He’s seen his group called 
‘Ugly Citizens for Each Other’ and ‘racist pigs.’”). 
132 Childish Slur, supra note 129. 
133 Seely & Breidenbach, supra note 131. 
134 Lipkowitz, supra note 117. 
135 Gage, supra note 116. 
136 Two founders of UCE resigned from the organization in 2000 when UCE 
leaders “failed to condemn” a newspaper column that said that violence can be both 
necessary and honorable.  Upstate Citizens Founders Leave Group over Column, 
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Apr. 7, 2000, at B1. 
137 Teicher, supra note 120. 
138 Seely & Breidenbach, supra note 131.  The mock missiles “pointed in the 
direction of Turning Stone Casino Resort.”  Michelle Breidenbach, Forum Looks at 
Climate of Hate: Oneidas Sponsor Talk Pegged to Hate Crimes Act, Which Takes 
Effect Next Week, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Oct. 6, 2000, at B1. 
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thirty-four people who formed a group they labeled United 
States National Freedom Fighters (“USNFF”), in which the 
group threatened to begin “blood shedding.”139  The group 
promised to: 
[E]xecute one Indian approximately every three days, starting 
on Thanksgiving day.  We will also execute one U.S. citizen 
(from the upstate NY area) who is noticed by one of the 
USNFF members as a person who contributes to the Indian 
nation by supporting the Casino and SavOn Gas Stations.  
Women will not be spared.  Those who contribute to the 
Indians are traitors, not worthy of sympathy.
140
 
The letter ended ominously: “[F]our VERY courageous 
people in the USNFF have offered to give their lives for this 
cause–they will do so by driving two to four trucks carrying 
explosives into the Oneida Indian Nation’s Casino.”141  UCE 
distanced itself from USNFF and “denounced the threats.”142  
Yet, as the editors of a local non-Indian newspaper pointed out 
following the threats, UCE bore some responsibility for the 
USNFF letter by creating an environment filled with hate.143  
UCE’s “vitriolic rhethoric favored by some UCE members may 
be seen by some as giving them license to commit mayhem. . . . 
It’s not that long a leap, in the minds of stupid people filled with 
hate” to go from the standard language employed by UCE to a 
threat of violence.144 
A separate more recent incident highlights the thin line 
between mere words and violence.  David Vickers, UCE 
President in 2006, while discussing legal challenges to the Oneida 
casino, said, “We live in a modern society.  These people can’t 
be shot, so we have to try to do what we can legally.”145  When 
 
139 Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75, 111 
(2003). 
140 Letter from the United States National Freedom Fighters to the Utica 
Observer-Dispatch, reprinted in Michelle Breidenbach, Group Threatens to Kill 
Indians, Others Angry over Land Claim, Group Also Says It Will Bomb Casino.  
Police, FBI Investigate, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Nov. 5, 1999, at A1. 
141 Id. 
142 Breidenbach, supra note 140. 
143 See Editorial, Threats Against Oneidas: Cowards in Climate of Hate, POST-
STANDARD (SYRACUSE, N.Y.), Nov. 10, 1999, at A18. 
144 Id. 
145 Peter Lyman, Oneidas Accuse UCE Head of Racism: David Vickers Defends 
“These People Can’t Be Shot” Comment on Radio Show, POST-STANDARD 
(Syracuse, N.Y.), Dec. 8, 2006, at A1. 
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the host interrupted to say, “Not that you would want them 
shot,” Vickers added a qualification, “No, of course not.”146  
Backed into a corner, Vickers tried to clarify that when he said 
“These people can’t be shot,” he was “referring to the 
government, not the Indians.”147  But ultimately, in defending his 
statement, Vickers drew upon a racist distinction, unfortunately 
elevated into American law by the Supreme Court, between 
Indians and civilized people.148  Vickers’s excuses highlighted 
that he saw himself as a “civilized human being taking [his] case 
to court,”149 and that all he was doing was “making a comparison 
to how we do behave in a civilized society . . . . We seek to have 
laws enforced.  That’s all.”150  Much is revealed by Vickers’s 
statement and by his excuses–both the vehemence of the 
dispute and UCE’s expectation that Indians should have non-
Indian norms and laws enforced against them. 
B.  Fairness and Oneida Success 
Bombs did not destroy Turning Stone Casino, people filling 
up at Oneida-owned gas stations were not targeted, and Indians 
were not shot.  But these threats were atypically strong 
expressions of much wider popular resentment of the Oneida’s 
supposedly unfair business success and sudden wealth.  As one 
letter to the editor noted, “The fairness notion has not been 
important when the white guys had things going in a favorable 
direction for them.  Now, however, when the Native Americans 
come to the table with some power and some money, it creates a 
big whine from people who suddenly want to assure fairness.”151  
The whine, or less pejoratively the “complaints,” in the area 
 
146 Id. 
147 Jennifer Fusco, Vickers’ Comments Draw Rebuke from Oneidas, OBSERVER-
DISPATCH (Utica, N.Y), Dec. 8, 2006, at A1. 
148 Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr., deserves a lot of credit for his 
groundbreaking works that explore the relationship between racist understandings 
of Indian people and the development of federal Indian law.  See ROBERT A. 
WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED 
WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY 
OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005). 
149 Fusco, supra note 147 (quoting Vickers). 
150 Lyman, supra note 145. 
151 Doug Nessle, Letter to the Editor, UCE’s Call for Fairness Rings Hollow, 
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), July 9, 2000. 
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focused on the tribe’s business success, especially the tribe’s legal 
and tax advantages over non-Indian businesses.  On a personal 
level, many non-Indians accustomed to the poverty of their 
Indian neighbors have not taken the newfound wealth of the 
Oneida in stride.  Because the gains made by the Oneida are tied 
to rights connected with tribal sovereignty, and thus not 
available to non-Indian individuals or businesses, their success is 
seen as unfair. 
The Oneida Indian Nation, under Ray Halbritter’s leadership, 
has developed a sprawling business empire.152  As the Oneida 
Nation’s 1999 Annual Report notes, the tribe is not a casino 
operator that incidentally has a separate government; it is “a 
government that happens to operate a casino.”153  But the tribe 
also owns and operates restaurants, marinas, gas and 
convenience stores, a campground and RV-park, an air charter 
business, a newspaper, golf courses, a slot machine factory,       
T-shirt printing factory, luxury and budget hotels, a convention 
center, a Las Vegas-style theater, and smoke shops.154  The 
positive impact of Oneida’s business enterprises on the local 
economy has earned some non-Indian support.  According to the 
Oneida Nation, the tribe has “created almost 5,000 jobs,” ninety-
five percent of which are held by area non-Indians.155  “Those 
that work there are naturally in favor of what their employer 
wants,” UCE President David Vickers was forced to 
acknowledge when tribal employees show up in T-shirts reading 
“My job, my vote” to support the tribe’s land claims.156  As one 
letter to the editor of a local newspaper critical of UCE noted, 
 
152  For more on the challenges and controversies within the Oneida Tribe 
surrounding both economic development and Ray Halbritter, see Bruce E. 
Johansen, The New York Oneidas: A Business Called a Nation, in ENDURING 
LEGACIES: NATIVE AMERICAN TREATIES AND CONTEMPORARY 
CONTROVERSIES 95–133 (Bruce E. Johansen ed., 2004). 
153 Gage, supra note 116. 
154 This is a compiled list created from a number of sources.  Braveman, supra 
note 139, at 110; Breidenbach, supra note 140; Carter, supra note 119; see Krista J. 
Karch, Turning Stone Major Employer in Central New York, OBSERVER-DISPATCH 
(Utica, N.Y.), Feb. 6, 2005. 
155 Fact Sheet, Oneida Indian Nation, Positive Economic Impact of the Oneida 
Indian Nation, available at http://www.oneidaindiannation.com/pressroom/factsheets/ 
26836179.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
156 Alaina Potrikus, Hearings Start Oneida Land Trust Application: Making Land 
Tax-Free Will Protect Jobs, Save the Local Economy, Employees Say, POST-
STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Jan. 15, 2006, at B1. 
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any other employer that created so many jobs “would get the 
red-carpet treatment. . . . [T]he Nation may be the only good 
economic thing our area has going for it.”157  Ironically, even if 
they are not employees of the tribe, UCE members may benefit 
from Oneida business success: Oneida-driven economic 
development reduces the municipal cost of borrowing,158 and 
allows the tribe to make discretionary transfers in a way 
mirroring PILOT (payment in lieu of taxes) programs for area 
governments.159  On a national level, Oneida success may help 
ensure that the U.S. government targets resources to tribes with 
greater needs.160 
The challenge created by tribal business success and pervasive 
employer-employee contacts is that non-Indians start to 
experience and perceive the Oneida Nation and, similarly, 
entrepreneurial tribes more as businesses than sovereign 
nations.161  Or as stated by a UCE attorney, “In the 1980s, if 
someone said ‘Indian’ people would think of a picture of a guy 
with a tear running down his face, caring for the environment. If 
you say Indians now they think of casinos.”162  As Nazareth 
College President Daan Braveman argues, such businesses make 
Indians seem less distinctly “other,” which can create the 
 
157 Frank Sperduto, Letter to the Editor, Oneida Indian Nation May Be Golden 
Goose, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Apr. 26, 2005, at A9. 
158 See Chen, supra note 118 (“[T]he Oneidas’ economic muscle had, among 
other benefits, helped convince Wall Street to upgrade Oneida County’s municipal 
bond rating, saving taxpayers $3.2 million in borrowing costs.”); Carter, supra note 
119 (“Employment at the casino and other projects has boosted the economy so 
much that the county has won a Triple A bond rating, reducing the cost of 
municipal borrowing.”). 
159 Labeled “Silver Covenant Chain” payments, Oneida county officials have, 
despite the obvious similarities, highlighted the discretionary, “gift”-like attributes 
of the Oneida Indian Nation’s Silver Covenant Chain payments to reject the PILOT 
identification.  See Press Release, Ralph J. Eannace, Jr., Office of the County 
Executive, Oneida County Will Continue to “Make Whole” Communities in Indian 
Land Claim Area (Mar. 14, 2003). 
160 Carter, supra note 119 (“Although entitled to federal assistance programs, the 
Oneidas have asked the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs to keep money designated 
for them and use it for Native Americans in greater need.”). 
161 See Gage, supra note 116 (“For better or worse, the Oneidas’ contemporary 
efforts to right historic wrongs through land claims are inseparable from the 
prospect of casino riches and business expansion.  In that sense, the Oneidas have 
already fulfilled UCE’s fondest dream: They have become good Americans.”). 
162 Ellen Barry, Tribal Gamble: The Lure and Peril of Indian Gaming, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2000, at A19 (quoting Peter Gass, an Upstate Citizens for Equality 
attorney). 
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“temptation to conclude that tribes should lose their unique 
sovereignty when they behave like members of the dominant 
community.”163  This “temptation” is evident in non-Indian 
accusations of the unfairness of business advantages the Oneida 
Nation has as a result of its sovereign status. 
The “unfairness” most frequently complained about is that 
Oneida businesses are exempt from certain taxes, allowing them 
to compete on price in an “unfair” way.164  Though Ray 
Halbritter “jokes that if word got out that a Native American 
casino was on the moon, people would go there and try to tax 
it,”165 non-Indians take Oneida freedom from taxation very 
seriously.  UCE argues that permitting land to become tribal 
trust land places all other businesses in New York “in immediate 
positions of unfair, second-class status.”166  Oneida sales-tax 
exemption is seen as a tool for driving out smaller non-Indian 
business.167 
The challenge when considering the effect of tribal tax 
advantages is separating out tax-driven business effects from 
narratives that use tribal advantages to scapegoat for losses that 
are not a consequence of Oneida business advantages.  
Attributing general tax increases to the Oneida Nation is one 
example.168  Similarly, non-Indian assertions that declines in 
 
163 Braveman, supra note 139, at 110. 
164 See, e.g., Jan Golab, The Festering Problem of Indian “Sovereignty”.  Congress 
Sleeps.  Indians Rule., 15 AM. ENTERPRISE No. 6, at 26, Sept. 1, 2004 (“The true 
meaning of sovereignty, [Executive Director of United Property Owners, Barb] 
Lindsay says, is tax evasion.”); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court 
and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121, 161 (2006) (noting the Supreme 
Court’s disfavor of tribal exemptions from state taxation). 
165 Carter, supra note 119. 
166 David B. Vickers, Op-Ed., Two Nations . . . Divisible: What’s to Become of 
Land Purchased by the Oneida Indian Nation? New York Can’t Give Up Control 
over These Acres, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Feb. 19, 2006, at D1. 
167 Gage, supra note 116. 
168 For an example of an assertion that the Oneida Nation is responsible for 
general tax increases, see Krista J. Karch, Sherrill Tense in Advance of Court 
Arguments, OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Utica, N.Y.), Jan. 9, 2005, at 1A (quoting a 
resident’s assertion that “[m]y taxes have gone up a lot.  It seems that (the Nation) 
doesn’t want to come to a settlement, and it’s costing me money.”).  But see G. 
William Rice, Teaching Decolonization: Reacquisition of Indian Lands Within and 
Without the Box–An Essay, 82 N.D. L. REV. 811, 845–46 (2006).  (“All tribes 
should have the authority to reacquire the lands within their territorial     
boundaries . . . . Since the state and local governments would no longer be 
responsible for provision of services on such lands, it would seem that any claim 
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business revenue are necessarily connected to tribal businesses 
strain credibility.169  Oneida tax advantages can be used in a 
politically opportunistic way, a fact that was ironically 
highlighted by UCE’s skeptical response to a recent publicity 
stunt targeting Ray Halbritter.170  That being said, it must be 
acknowledged that while these advantages do not by themselves 
allow the Oneida “to crush direct competition,”171 the tribe can 
operate its businesses in ways not available to non-Indian 
entrepreneurs.  Such an acknowledgment, however, is the start, 
not the end, of the discussion given the tribe’s governmental 
status.  For example, one critic of the Oneida Nation estimated 
the tribe saved $400 million between 1995 and 2007 because of 
its tax exempt status.172  To which the tribal spokesman 
responded, “They should have used a historian instead of an 
economist, because it’s not an issue of dollars and cents–it’s an 
issue of principle.”173 
When wealth is involved, jealousy can harden into principle.  
One such principle expressed by some non-Indians is that no one 
should have special rights, even if such rights are tied to Indian 
status.174  As one UCE member stated, “I just don’t like the idea 
 
they continued to promote respecting taxation or jurisdiction over such lands would 
be without merit.”). 
169 The accounting conveyed through anecdotal reporting can be surprisingly 
detailed.  See, e.g., Teicher, supra note 120 (relating the story of one UCE member 
who claimed that the Oneida hotel “took away 14” reservations in one year). 
170 In 2007, assemblyman David Townsend sent an open letter, in flyer form, to 
Ray Halbritter comparing the general duty “everyone” has to pay taxes with 
Oneida non-payment of taxes.  Glenn Coin, Flier: Tell Oneidas to Pay Their Taxes; 
Assemblyman Urges Residents to Clip Out Letter, Mail It to Halbritter, POST-
STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), May 25, 2007, at B1.  In a newspaper interview, UCE 
President David Vickers asked, “Does he really think if people send letters to 
Halbritter that Halbritter will say, ‘Gee, OK, I guess I’ll pay now?’”  Id.  Vickers 
explained the flyer by adding, “What Townsend is trying to do is focus everybody’s 
anger at Halbritter.”  Id. 
171 Karch, supra note 154. 
172 Glenn Coin, Oneida Nation Profits $115M: Report Commissioned by State 
Shows Nation’s Businesses Worth $2 Billion, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), 
Mar. 17, 2007, at A1 (reporting the results of a study by Professor Gregg Jarrell). 
173 Id. 
174 Katz, supra note 122 (reporting that “[r]esidents in the Cayuga land claim area 
say the Cayuga Indians should not have any more rights than other Americans” and 
including the notion, expressed by a non-Indian born in the United States, that non-
Indians are as Native American as members of an Indian tribe). 
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of super-citizens in the United States.”175  At a UCE meeting 
after landowners were joined as defendants a “few people even 
donned Colonial-era garb and displayed a sign that read, ‘What 
About Our Rights?’”176  Yet, the fact of sudden wealth may be as 
important as the expressed equality principle.  As the New York 
Times reported: 
[T]he land-claim dispute has brought to the surface a latent 
sense of frustration and jealousy over the phenomenal success 
of the Oneida Indian Nation . . . . Just like that, it seems, the 
Oneidas have rocketed from poverty to affluence, from being 
the have-nots to the haves, while everyone else in a working-
class area stocked with grind-it-out dairy farmers has seen 
income stagnate.
177
 
This latent jealousy owes itself partly to the principles 
involved, but also to the contrast between the riches of the tribe 
today and their recent “ragtag” condition.178  As one letter to the 
editor pointed out, being “bothered that the Oneidas have 
acquired some wealth, suggest[s] that we still want our Indians 
poor and invisible.”179  The jealous backlash to sudden Indian 
wealth in New York echoes non-Indian reaction to the success of 
the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe in Connecticut: “[T]heir sudden 
rise out of poverty has been a bitter pill to swallow.”180  In the 
memorable words of one non-Indian from Foxwoods Casino’s 
hometown of Ledyard, the Pequots “never had a pot to pee in, 
and all of a sudden they’re driving in $40,000 cars.”181  Dislike of 
 
175 Krista J. Karch, Emotions High over Land-Claim Settlement, OBSERVER-
DISPATCH (Utica, N.Y.), Dec. 9, 2004, at A1 (quoting Karl Esengard, owner of a 
Western-themed store who hoped to move to where there were no Indians); accord 
Carter, supra note 119 (quoting 1999 UCE President Scott Peterman saying of the 
Oneida, “They’re not treated equally, they’re treated as super citizens.”). 
176 Chen, supra note 118. 
177 Id. 
178 Carter, supra note 119 (“The marble floors, valet parking and curving 
architecture of Turning Stone Casino Resort make it hard to believe that the 
Oneida Indians who own it were so recently a ragtag lot, clinging to a 32-acre 
reservation as their only asset.”); see also Carpenter & Halbritter, supra note 9, at 
312–13 (arguing that tribes are derided as backward if they are not economically 
successful and “criticized as departing from customary Indian activities” when they 
are economically successful). 
179 Bill Sullivan, Letter to the Editor, Ignorance, Racial Rhetoric Offend White 
People Too, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Jan. 4, 1999, at A11. 
180 Barry, supra note 162. 
181 Id. 
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tribal tax advantage is even more “galling” when it seems as if 
non-Indian “working stiffs . . . are subsidizing” wealthy members 
of casino tribes.182 
IV 
EFFECT ON ASSESSED LAND VALUES OF NON-INDIAN 
PROPERTY OWNERS 
Strong feelings in upstate New York regarding Oneida success 
and land claims generate many popular assumptions that do not 
necessarily reflect the actual effects on non-Indian property 
values of Oneida land purchases.  Without question, many area 
non-Indians believe their property value is being negatively 
impacted by Oneida land acquisition.  Anecdotally, “[Area 
resident Deborah] Anderson-Gaiser said the lawsuits have 
pushed land value into the ground. ‘There’s a cloud over my 
property,’ she said.”183  Similarly, another upstate New Yorker, 
Daniel Gates, blamed the Oneida lawsuit on his inability to sell 
his farm for two years despite dramatically lowering his price.184  
Yet the opinions of real estate professionals related to land claim 
effects on property values are mixed.185  The problem with these 
 
182 Chen, supra note 118 (quoting UCE President Scott Peterman).  Because the 
Oneida Nation does not simply disperse its income in per capita payments to all 
members, not all tribal members are in fact wealthy.  See Carter, supra note 119 
(“[W]hile some Oneidas are flourishing, a trip to the reservation today, where 
dozens still live in trailers, makes it clear that sudden wealth has not reached 
everyone.”); Carpenter & Halbritter, supra note 9, at 323 (stating that the Oneida 
Nation “encourages its members to be self-reliant” by not making per capita 
payments); see also Coin, supra note 172 (reporting that “Nation businesses are 
worth more than $2 billion–about $6 million for each of the nation’s 343 
households” according to a study by Professor Gregg Jarrell). 
183 Karch, supra note 175. 
184 Farmer Finds No Buyers for Prime Property, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), 
Oct. 24, 1999, at A8 (“He’s trying to sell almost all of it to pay off tens of thousands 
of dollars in debt, but claims the Oneidas’ lawsuit scares off potential buyers.  
‘Would you buy anything that you could not get clear title to?’ he asked.  Gates has 
been trying to sell the farmland and his home without success for about two years.  
Even after dropping the prices to well below market value, he said, there are no 
takers.”). 
185 Compare id.  (“Real estate brokers agree with Gates.  Because of the difficulty 
in insuring titles, selling in the land claim area is ‘a nightmare,’ said Michael Gaiser, 
an independent real estate broker, because it is difficult to insure titles.”), with 
Karch, supra note 154 (“Jackson said that in her 20 years in the Realty business, 
only two people have ever backed out of contracts because of land claim fears.  ‘I 
don’t really feel that has affected us at all,’ she said.  In the late 1990s, heightened 
tensions in the Nation’s decades-old land claim raised fears that property values 
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anecdotes, aside from the normal limits of anecdotes, is that they 
could be describing uncertainty regarding security of title, but 
not capturing the effect of Indian ownership on neighboring 
property values. 
A.  Proximity to Indian Land on Non-Indian Assessed Property 
Values 
Empirical research on the effects of Indian land acquisition 
can shed some light on the assumption–made by the Court in 
Sherrill–of harm to non-Indian property owners.  To better 
understand whether non-Indians have been harmed by Oneida 
land purchases, I examined, with the help of two other 
researchers, the relationship between tribal land ownership and 
property value of neighboring non-Indian property owners in 
Madison County, New York.186  This research was motivated in 
part by Professor Frickey’s recent push for more grounded, 
empirical work by Indian law scholars.187 
Though in its initial stages, our research so far does not 
support the U.S. Supreme Court’s assumption that Indian 
property ownership harms neighboring non-Indian property 
owners.  We used ArcSoft to analyze information contained in a 
Shapefile database of all the parcels of land located in Madison 
County, New York.188  Using Geospatial Information Systems 
software, we tagged each parcel within the county with the land’s 
assessed value according to county tax records.  By pairing 
parcel data such as land type (rural, urban, etc.) and physical 
size/boundaries with parcel by parcel land assessments from 2002 
to 2007, we were able to better understand the geospatial 
relationship between Oneida-owned land and surrounding non-
 
would plummet as both buyers and sellers lived amid uncertainty about whether the 
Nation would eventually wind up with the land.  But, Jackson said, property value 
has actually risen slightly in the region over the past decade.”). 
186 See Rosser, Guertin & Rukin, supra note 1. 
187 See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New 
Realism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 664 (2006) (advocating work 
that is “more empirical, less doctrinal, more experiential, more narrative, less 
stridently normative, potentially more interdisciplinary.”); see also Alexa Koenig, 
“The Actual State of Things”: Empirical Scholarship in Indian Country (work in 
progress July 2008) (on file with the author) (detailing existing empirical Indian law 
scholarship). 
188 Madison County Shapefile data is available from the county for a fee of $350. 
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Indian land.189  The idea underlying this research was that such 
an analysis of property values could shed light on whether there 
is a relationship between neighboring non-Indian property 
values and Indian land ownership and control. 
Our first run through the data, looking at the entire county as 
a single data set, did seem to pick up on a difference in property 
value for land located within half a mile of Oneida-owned 
parcels and other non-Indian land.  However, out of concern 
that our initial results were being driven by factors other than 
Indian ownership, we looked more closely at the effect of 
Oneida ownership, focusing on two county school districts with a 
sufficient number of Oneida-owned parcels to allow for analysis.  
Doing this allowed us to correct for the effect rural-urban 
difference can play, as well as the role school quality can play in 
driving property value differentials across school districts.  
Though Indian ownership did seem to have a correlation with 
higher property values in one of the two districts, our overall 
conclusion from the data is a modest one: that the Supreme 
Court was not justified, at least with regard to property values, in 
asserting non-Indians were harmed by “disruptive” Oneida 
Indian land ownership. 
Perhaps of equal importance, our limited empirical 
examination of Madison County revealed the limits of isolated 
empiricism.  Regardless of whether the property values of non-
Indian-owned land near tribally owned land exceed or fall short 
of general county property value changes, the larger questions 
involving the appropriateness of Indian land reacquisition 
cannot be answered by empirical results alone. 
Empirical work regarding tribes is challenging; the size of 
tribes and the differences between tribes diminish the usefulness 
of even the most robust findings.  After the Oneida Nation went 
on its buying spree, its total land holdings in Madison County 
still only accounted for 1.5% of the county’s total land base.  
Real estate is popularly said to be primarily about “location, 
location, location.”  The Supreme Court’s assumption that 
Indian ownership and control harms non-Indians invites a study 
such as ours that looks at this assumption through empirical 
analysis of property data.  Yet because the Oneida and other 
 
189 The categories are those captured by tax assessments and by the physical 
information contained in the Shapefile. 
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tribes have been so thoroughly dispossessed of their land, the 
effect of Indian land ownership cannot be separated from the 
many other attributes, such as area location or land use type, 
that characterize the Indian and neighboring non-Indian land 
holdings. 
Even if you could definitively say that Indian land ownership 
and control did or did not adversely affect neighboring non-
Indian property owners for one particular tribe, such a result 
would at best have limited relevance or utility when looking at 
other tribes’ situations.  Elsewhere I have described the diversity 
of the more than 500 tribes and argued that legal generalizations 
that treat all tribes the same should be avoided.190  In examining 
the consequences of tribal land ownership, locational uniqueness 
of property is coupled with tribal diversity to make property 
generalizations perhaps more problematic than legal 
generalizations.191  Tribes hold land in many different forms, 
from fee simple to allotments to tribal trust land.  But even if 
such land holding forms are collapsed into the generic “Indian 
land” category–which probably reflects how non-Indians see 
such land–each tribe has its own unique land base and 
relationship to neighboring non-Indian property owners.192 
Empirical work provides a limited window upon the 
relationship between tribal land holdings and non-Indian 
property owners, but does not by itself either prove or disprove 
the assumption of harm to non-Indian property owners.  
Because such research is necessarily tribe and location specific, 
in some respects the results of any property study will be 
anecdotal in ways similar to the anecdotes of real estate agents 
or even the complaints of individual property owners.  This 
observation is not meant to disparage empirical work.  To 
 
190 Rosser, supra note 102, at 142. 
191 For example, the reservation/off-reservation checkerboard form of land 
ownership that exists between Farmington, New Mexico, and the Navajo Nation is 
different from the checkerboard pattern caused by Oneida’s land purchases in 
Madison County.  On a more micro level, even involving a single reservation, the 
checkerboard complications are different near Gallup, New Mexico, than they are 
near Farmington. 
192 A good way of understanding the variety of Indian land holding forms is to 
compare land tenure across reservations.  See IMRE SUTTON, INDIAN LAND 
TENURE: BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS AND A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE 85 
(1975) (using land tenure maps to compare the Bad River, Southern Ute, and Pala 
Indian Reservations). 
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understand whether the Court is justified in its negative 
assumptions regarding Indian land ownership and control, an 
analysis of the correlation between Indian ownership and non-
Indian property values using property data can help justify or, 
here, discount such assumptions.  But saying whether non-
Indians are affected by Indian ownership does not tell us 
whether the law should protect non-Indian property owners 
from tribal land reacquisition side effects. 
B.  Expectations and Innocence of Non-Indians 
Should property owners be protected from adverse 
consequences of Indian land ownership and control?  To answer 
this question it is instructive to return to property law basics.  
Property law protects owners against many risks by defining the 
rights of owners and neighbors in a way that helps ensure a 
degree of land use predictability, but property ownership in 
many ways is defined by the risk born by owners.193  When things 
go well–when the area experiences economic growth or when 
demand for the owner’s property goes up for other reasons–risk 
is experienced as increased equity.194  However, when things go 
poorly, for example, when an industry declines or when crime 
goes up, the owner must suffer the consequences.  Typically, 
property owners have little recourse when their property loses 
value.195  With only a few narrow exceptions under the common 
law, property owners who were not having their beneficial use 
rights infringed upon could not prevent a neighbor from using 
their land in a way that caused area land prices to fall.196  
 
193 In a recent article, Professor Lee Anne Fennell puts forward the advantages 
of separating ownership risk from ownership control.  See Lee Anne Fennell, 
Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008).  The need for such 
scholarship fits within the proverbial expression, the exception that proves the rule. 
194 Population growth, coupled with risk, helps explain why the savings of most 
Americans come in the form of homeownership. 
195 The subprime mortgage proposals being considered as options to alleviate the 
current housing crisis focus primarily on rewriting abusive or predatory loans, not 
on protecting owners against loss in the value of their homes.  See generally Rayth  
T. Myers, Comment, Foreclosing on the Subprime Loan Crisis: Why Current 
Regulations Are Flawed and What Is Needed to Stop Another Crisis from Occurring, 
87 OR. L. REV. 311 (2008) (describing several of the proposals being considered). 
196 The rise of private ordering in the form of common interest community 
regulation designed to curtail what neighbors can do on their property through 
contract law attests to the indifference of property law to the downside risk held by 
owners.  For more on common interest communities, see, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, 
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Moreover, it is Property Law 101 that ownership risk extends to 
risk associated with government action or inaction.197  So long as 
it does not amount to a taking, owners bear not only market risk 
but the risk that their property will decline in value through 
government action or inaction.  For example, when a metro line 
is extended farther into the suburbs, land owners benefit.198  
Alternatively, when a city abandons a successful city 
beautification program or when the government cuts back on 
farm subsidies, private owners affected by such decisions cannot 
claim that they have a property-based right tied to their land 
value stemming from such programs.  Whether by government 
action, the actions of neighbors, or changes in the surrounding 
economy, land ownership normally is associated with some 
degree of risk outside of owner control. 
What makes risk associated with tribal land reacquisition 
different from “normal” neighborly, economic, or business risk?  
Put in the terms of the Sherrill Court, non-Indian property 
owners can be harmed by many external forces; why should the 
Court cry foul over risk linked to Indian nations when it permits 
the many other risks of ownership?  The anger among non-
Indians in upstate New York toward the Oneida suggests that a 
critical distinction between most neighbors and Indian neighbors 
is the tribal tax exemption.  As Sherrill demonstrates, the Oneida 
Nation was not only buying land, it was attempting to 
unilaterally remove such land from the tax base.  The problem 
with such a distinction is that it runs into analogous non-Indian 
parallels allowed by property law and the Court. 
When universities buy property and use it as part of the 
institution’s academic program, cities lose that part of their tax 
 
PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL 
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994). 
197 In a recent article, Professor Anup Malani argues that because property 
values internalize legal changes, laws can be judged based on their effect on housing 
prices.  See Anup Malani, Valuing Laws As Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1274 (2008).  This article rejects Professor Malani’s argument in as much as it insists 
that even if harm to non-Indian property owners could be proven, it is best that they 
should have to suffer such an effect of Indian land ownership. 
198 If the line extension is a foregone conclusion, then land prices will increase 
prior to the official announcement, but important government action still underlies 
the change in value.  Insiders, with knowledge of future government action, have an 
incentive to purchase property in advance of general knowledge of the impending 
change so they can reap the reward associated with the government’s property 
value increasing policy. 
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base.  When part of a city decides to become independent and 
separates from the original city, the larger city’s tax base 
declines.  And when property is taken through eminent domain, 
the locality’s tax base diminishes.  These examples do not show 
that tribal land acquisition has no effect on the surrounding area, 
but they do demonstrate that there is no firm rule against 
removing land from an area’s tax base. 
Returning to the basics of property law reveals that owner 
expectations are crucial for understanding the sense that non-
Indians are harmed by Indian land acquisition.  Ownership risk 
that is expected–whether tied to neighbors, the market, or 
familiar governments–is accepted, whereas unexpected 
ownership risk connected to tribes is not.199  The irony is striking.  
The first case in the leading property law textbook is, not 
coincidentally, an Indian law case that can shed a lot of light on 
the expectations of non-Indian property owners.200  In some 
respects this seminal case, Johnson v. M’Intosh,201 is the opposite 
of Sherrill.  In Sherrill, the Court considered the rights of an 
Indian tribe that had purchased land from non-Indians; in 
Johnson, the Court compared the rights of an investor who had 
bought land from an Indian tribe to the rights of a non-Indian 
who ostensibly purchased the same land from the U.S. 
government.202  In an opinion written by Chief Justice John 
Marshall, relying upon racism-laced laws that diminished the 
rights of Indian tribes relative to European-Christian nations, 
 
199 Homeowner activism plays an important role policing what is accepted and 
what is not accepted, and does so with a goal of protecting housing values.  See 
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEOWNER HYPOTHESIS (2001) (emphasizing the 
role homeowners play in protecting their largest investment, their homes, against 
risk). 
200 The most commonly used textbook in the field is JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES 
E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, & MICHAEL H. SCHILL, PROPERTY LAW 
(6th ed. 2006).  Perhaps the second-leading property law textbook also starts with 
the same Indian law case, but it is less surprisingly so because the author also has a 
demonstrated scholarly commitment to Indian law.  See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY LAW (4th ed. 2006). 
201 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
202 In a great article, Professor Eric Kades shows that there was not an actual case 
or controversy between the parties to the action.  Instead, the land purchases upon 
which the case was based never in fact overlapped, a fact not recognized until 
Professor Kades published his work.  See Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of 
the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 67, 68 (2001) 
(showing a map demonstrating that the land claims of the parties were not 
overlapping). 
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the Court held that non-Indians who purchased land from the 
government had superior title to non-Indians who purchased 
land directly from tribes.  In my Indian Law class, I focus the 
discussion of Johnson on its reliance on anti-Indian racism, 
introducing a theme that helps explain over the course of the 
seminar much of the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence.  In 
Property Law, the focus is different.  While students do pick up 
on the racism in the opinion; Johnson emphasizes the state’s role 
in saying what property is and what rights owners have.  Johnson 
makes it clear that property comes from and requires state 
recognition of ownership, and that the state plays a central role 
establishing the expectations owners can have regarding “their” 
property. 
The Sherrill opinion is depressing, aside from the reasons 
identified by others,203 because it fails to recognize one of 
property law’s central tenets: that owners’ expectations are best 
understood in terms of situational requirements.  Property law is 
replete with examples of seemingly straightforward ownership 
rights being diminished or negated because of applicable 
customs, or alternatively, of owner expectations being upset 
through the creation of new customs.  Thus, the person who 
finds a whale that has washed up on a beach does not own that 
whale because of an area business custom.204  The person who 
has been hunting a fox must bow to a judicially imposed 
definition of capture and cannot rely upon the custom of local 
hunters.205  Similarly, the landowner cannot even exclude 
trespassing attorneys because of a judge’s ideas regarding good 
public policy,206 and so on.  Yet, the Court in Sherrill does not 
acknowledge that the expectations of non-Indian property 
owners should be informed by the fact that their property is 
located within the Oneida Nation’s original reservation. 
Non-Indian property owners within the Oneida reservation 
assert a right to the same expectations regarding their property 
as off-reservation owners because current non-Indian property 
owners are said to be “indisputably innocent of any wrongdoing” 
 
203 See supra notes 16–28 and accompanying text. 
204 Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881). 
205 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
206 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
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toward Indians.207  Even in his dissent, Justice Stevens describes 
non-Indians as “innocent landowners.”208  Non-Indian property 
owners affected by Oneida land-claim efforts argue that they 
“didn’t swindle anybody.”209  Feelings are so strong that even 
those who acquired land much closer to when the Oneida first 
lost their land fail to see the connection between the past and 
their present claim of innocence.210  One non-Indian, Daniel W. 
Gates, can trace his farm back to 1798 when his “great-great-
great-great-grandfather, Zepheniah” purchased the land, yet he 
blames the Oneida for unmet expectations regarding the sale of 
his farm.211  Irony is lost on another non-Indian couple: Mary 
Leonard, “What the Indians are doing is wrong”; Robert 
 
207 Gus P. Coldebella & Mark S. Puzella, The Landowner Defendants in Indian 
Land Claims: Hostages to History, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 585, 585 (2003) (written by 
attorneys with Goodwin Procter, a firm that represented non-Indian landowner 
defendants). 
208 City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 226 
(2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
209 Seely & Breidenbach, supra note 131; see also Nessle, supra note 151 (“Should 
Native Americans withhold their attempts at recouping their territory, or at least 
some of it, because the time lapse since they lost it leaves no one to accuse because 
they are all dead?  This is the position of UCE, as one member is quoted, ‘We are 
not guilty, we did not do anything.’  I am sure that if UCE members were victims of 
such atrocities as those perpetrated against Native Americans, they would be 
fighting mad no matter who is left to fight against and, in the American tradition, 
carry it on until corrective action is taken.”); Locklear, supra note 12, at 599 
(asserting that non-Indian property owners cannot claim innocence because Indian 
“claims have been known about for generations” and, despite living in a 
representative government, such non-Indians have done “[v]ery little” to “convince 
their government to settle these claims”). 
210 This is not to say that those who acquired land more recently did not have 
“constructive notice . . . that the parcels in question are in dispute.”  Matthews, 
supra note 30, at 183. 
211 Farmer Finds No Buyers, supra note 184.  Professor G. William Rice has 
described this attitude as “grandpa stole [Indian] land fair and square.”  Rice, supra 
note 168, at 813.  Tellingly, in an earlier response to non-Indian anger at the 
Oneida, one unsympathetic resident wrote: 
 The Oneida people have nothing to be ashamed of.  They did not take 
your land; your ancestors took theirs.  The Oneida people are now using 
legal tactics and money to buy back their own land.  This in itself is 
ludicrous. 
 If you want to be angry and protest, take up your concerns with your 
own government and your own conscience. 
 Your ancestors and your government are responsible for your present 
predicament, not the Oneida people.  The shoe is on the other foot and you 
can’t stand the pinch. 
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Leonard, “How would you feel if you were dispossessed of your 
land?”212 
By asserting the innocence of non-Indian property owners, the 
Court in Sherrill ignored the fact that, as one upstate New York 
non-Indian put it, “We’re the intruders here.”213  What this 
quote captures is the way non-Indians continue to benefit from 
the violation of reservation boundary integrity.214  In a recent 
article, Professor Frickey argues against a “retrospective on 
national guilt,” and quoting Frank Pommersheim, another 
Indian Law professor, writes that “[t]he point is not to assign 
blame–an essentially fruitless exercise.”215  I guess I am a 
greater believer in both guilt and blame.  One letter to the editor 
of Syracuse, New York’s Post-Standard helps explain the role 
appreciation for fault can play.  Chuck Davis, of Nedrow, New 
York, wrote, “[O]ur government cheated tribes out of millions 
of acres.  To this very day treaties are being torn apart word for 
twisted word.  So don’t whine because tribes are finally getting a 
fraction of their land back.”216  Questioning the innocence of 
non-Indian landowners allows us to question their expectation 
that Indians do not have a right to reacquire land or to upset the 
standard off-reservation expectations of property owners. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Reframing the characterization of the potential harm to non-
Indians from Indian land ownership and control, from 
principally about decreased property values to primarily about 
what the expectations of non-Indian property owners should be, 
permits us to move beyond the Court’s simplistic assumption of 
harm.  Sherrill was primarily justified using a problematic laches 
argument; however, the Court’s assumptions regarding border 
towns and checkerboard areas also played a role.  A 
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preoccupation with protecting the expectations of “innocent” 
non-Indian property owners led to the Court’s unexamined 
assumption that Indian ownership and control of land harms 
neighboring non-Indian property owners.  As our study shows, 
this assumption may not in fact reflect how Indian land holding 
affects non-Indians, and cannot be justified by empirics alone.  
Even if non-Indian property value negatively correlates with 
Indian land proximity, a concept that remains mere assumption, 
land value is not an adequate rationale for negating Indian 
sovereignty over reacquired land.  “Indian land claims raise 
fundamental questions of historical justice and responsibility” 
for which “Americans have never been forced to answer for.”217  
By not exploring its assumption that Indians harm non-Indian 
property owners, the Court fails to take into account the role of 
the law, and the Court, in forming the expectations behind ideas 
such as harm or benefit.  Guilt is a messy, unpleasant topic for 
the guilty, but if non-Indian guilt is just swept under the rug, 
Indians will lose key aspects of their sovereignty as non-Indians 
narrow their understanding of how they expect to be affected by 
Indians. 
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